# 1NC

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### 1NC

#### TOPICALITY:

#### Interpretation: the 1AC must propose and defend an instance of resolutional action.

#### The “federal government” means the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)\>

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### They violate each of the above words’ requirements of state action.

#### Two impacts:

#### First---FAIRNESS. Non-topical advocacies allow the aff to unilaterally determine negative positions and create an incentive to minimize viable contestation. Debate’s a game---competition precedes pedagogy because it’s a procedural question.

#### Second---CLASH. Open-ended topics make focused research, testing, and innovation impossible. Non-topical advocacies are impossible to predict, which is the foundation of argument interaction. The repetition of limited arguments over the course of a season fosters iterative education and teaches debaters how to anatomize power. Prioritize debate’s potential to forge a techne of argumentative refinement because that’s its only unique benefit.

### 1NC

#### **KRITIK:**

#### **The aff is a post-humanist romance - that’s anti-communist.**

DeFazio, 12 [Kimberly DeFazio, UW SYSTEM FELLOW, author of City of the Senses: Urban Culture and Urban Space (Palgrave 2011) and co-editor of Human, All Too (Post)Human (Lexington 2016). She recently co-edited a special issue of Nineteenth-Century Prose on Marx’s Speeches. Her writings have also appeared in such books as Confronting Universalities: Aesthetics and Politics Under the Sign of Globalisation (Aarhus University Press 2011) and Marxism and Urban Culture (2014) and in such journals as Nineteenth-Century Prose and Textual Practice, “Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism,” 2012, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm]//Townes

Rooted in the exploitation of labor, capitalism has always produced deep contradictions in social life, and it has therefore always required ideologies that explain away those contradictions. Throughout the capitalist era, certain ideological strategies become dominant when the advance of technology, driven by private accumulation, brings about qualitative changes that upturn everyday life, as happened, for instance, in the early stages of industrialization and resulting urbanization in Britain in the late eighteenth century; at the height of European imperialism at the turn of the 20th century; and in the shift to "post-industrial" capitalism in the 1960s and 1970s in the global North. At such times, dominant discourses absorb the material contradictions of the social into the immaterial realm of language, feeling and thought—where the sharp lines of class are blurred, the mechanistic aspects of life are made fluid, and the "ugliness" of the city is replaced by the aesthetics of nature.

In the 21st century, global capitalism's commodification of all aspects of life has reached new heights, requiring new modes of explaining away the material roots. From cloning and bioengineered food, to ever-newer forms of human-technological hybrids, to overfishing and industrialization of slaughterhouses, to the privatization of public sources of water and the selling of "hot air" (which makes it possible for rich nations to avoid lowering emissions), to the "synthetic biology" by which biocapitalists like J. Craig Venter hope new living creatures will be produced to substitute fossil fuels—there is no aspect of social or natural life that is immune from the market. Capital's endless and inherently crisis-ridden drive to accumulate profit has, on the one hand, led to a new scramble among nations of the global North to privatize the world's dwindling natural resources regardless of the human and ecological consequences. What this competitive drive has lead to, among other things, is the scientific explorations of new bio-horizons: what Venter calls a "new industrial revolution" (Pollack). On the other hand, the most recent effects of capitalist crisis—beginning with the 2007 housing market crash—have been used to justify further privatization of social resources, leading to historically unprecedented cuts in wages, employment and social programs throughout the global North.

It is not surprising, then, that cultural theory has become more and more concerned with the relation between human and non-human life and with the instrumentalities used by the former to control the latter. Broadly characterized by a "posthuman" displacement of humanist priorities of reason, rationality and Cartesian dualism, at the center of which is a human subject constructed as fundamentally different from and superior to non-human animals and life and capable of developing reliable knowledge of and control over the objective world—a wide range of cultural writing today has become concerned with the increasing subjugation of nature to human calculation and control, and call for a new inquiry into the relation of the human and its other. Some, like Giorgio Agamben, address the increasing efforts of the state to control and manage all aspects of human and non-human life (Homo Sacer; The Open). Others, like Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, focus on the efforts by corporations to privatize the knowledges, affects and technologies that have been developed through the collective energies of what they call the multitude: the efforts to enclose the digital commons in the interests of a powerful few (Commonwealth). Graham Harman goes so far as to suggest that the "being" of tools is constitutive of all being in the contemporary moment (Tool-Being), while Peter Menzel and Faith D'Alusio celebrate the displacement of homo sapiens by the notion of robo sapiens (Robo Sapiens). Among one of the most popular developments in contemporary posthumanist theory, animal studies, writers like Cary Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Kelly Oliver, and Matthew Calarco, taking their cue from Derrida's later writings (i.e., The Animal That Therefore I Am), address what is for them the instrumentalizing and unethical discourses of humanism, which justifies its violence toward non-human species by its epistemological centering of the human: the "anthropological machine" (Agamben, The Open).

But what drives the "new industrial revolution" (Venter) is what drove the "old" one: the use of technology to appropriate surplus labor (the source of profit) at the point of production. Profit is not derived from "nature" but labor: in order for nature to become a commodifiable resource, it must become transformed by human labor, which is itself a dialectical outcome of nature. This is another way of saying that the commodification of life on such a planetary scale today is only possible on the basis of the commodification of human labor power. Biocapitalism is first and foremost a regime of wage labor.

Contemporary cultural theory's concern with the effects of capitalism on non-human life, however, has mystified capital's material roots, and one of the central means by which this has been accomplished is what I call machine-thinking.

Machine-thinking treats capitalism as an instrumentalized mode of thinking: a mechanized mode of knowing which subjects all (non-) human life to its logic. Whether this logic is understood in the more positive terms of Henry Jenkins, John Johnston or Bernard Stiegler, who sees a fundamental connection between humans and technology and suggests that "The human invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool" (Stiegler, Technics and Time 141), or in the "negative" terms of those like Paul Virilio or Horkheimer and Adorno, who suggest that "A technological rationale is the rationale of domination itself. It is the coercive nature of society alienated from itself" (Dialectic of Enlightenment 121), machine-thinking (mis)reads as the instrumentalization of society what is in reality the marketization of society—by which I mean the domination of all aspects of life by exchange value and the subordination of use value (which meets human needs, including the need to preserve the earth's diverse ecological systems) to profit.

These misreadings, in effect, transcode the material relations of production under capitalism into the immaterial and translate the labor relations of the machine into instrumental reason. In different idioms, such discourses consequently turn the problem of capitalism into the problem of technologization and what Heidegger, one of the twentieth century's most influential machine-thinkers, calls "technē, a process of reflection in service to doing and making" ("Letter on Humanism" 218). On these terms, at stake is not exploitation but instrumentalization. Contemporary discourses see capitalism in terms of what Heidegger identifies in "The Question Concerning Technology" as the truth of technology in the modern era: its "enframing" logic (325), which ensures that in a technological age "even the cultivation of the field has comes under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry, air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example" (320).

But the focus on the way that, in a technological society, neither nature nor humans are meaningful in and of themselves but as means toward an end—or the way that, as Heidegger puts it, an instrumental approach "expedites in that it unlocks and exposes" and is fundamentally oriented "toward driving on the maximum yield at the minimum expense" (321)—isolates technology from both the broader material conditions in which it is developed and the class interests it serves. For capital "drives on the maximum yield at the minimum expense," not because of the "dialectic of enlightenment," as Horkheimer and Adorno contend, but for the purposes of private accumulation. Humans are "set upon" nature in order to maximize surplus labor for the owner who buys the labor of others and makes a profit from it. To put this another way, humans are set upon nature because they are set upon themselves. And because the material relations of society set the terms for the relations between humans and nature, only under fundamentally changed relations between humans can humans develop new relations to nature and non-human species.

Yet the solution to the instrumentalization of human and natural life for Heidegger and other (neo)romantics like Derrida, Wolfe, and Calarco is not a fundamental change in social relations but a return to the "material" as non-instrumental reason (the non-reason of nature, the body, feeling, spirit, "poeisis," the non-human, and so on): in short, a de-materialized material. Theorists of capitalism-as-machine-thinking construct a post-rational linguistic realm of higher values which are assumed to exceed restricting codes and conventions. For "mechanical" modes of thought which focus on classifying being and the "metaphysics" of presence (essentialism), they substitute speculative, fluid concepts which foreground becoming, flux, and hybridity—what Goethe refers to as "morphology" and Derrida calls the "double-session" and later "l'animot." For the Cartesian separation of subject and object they posit a subject which cannot be extricated from its embeddedness in the world except through a violent act of human(ist) abstraction.

Machine-thinkers, in other words, oppose the effects of capitalism by blurring social boundaries and essentializing epistemological distinctions in an effort, not to transform capitalism, but to find a freer mode of life outside of the social (outside the city). It involves, as Wolfe puts it in his annotation of R.L. Rutsky's theory of posthumanism, "participat[ing] in—and find[ing] a mode of thought adequate to—'processes which can never be entirely reduced to patterns or standards, codes or information'" (What is Posthumanism? xviii). This is a (not so distant) echo of Thoreau's romantic desire to "wander far beyond... the narrow limits" of restricting codes and conventions in everyday life, into the realm of what he calls "Extra vagance!": the fulfillment of the "desire to speak somewhere without bounds" (Walden 270).

Not coincidentally, the "nature" that thereby becomes valorized by critics of machine-thinking is, in effect, a rewriting of romantic discourses. As much as theorists locate themselves beyond naïve (humanist) constructions of nature, nature in contemporary theory is ultimately a bio-fantasy of a nature "outside" of and fundamentally disruptive of the social relations of production. In opposition to techne, in other words, machine-thinkers oppose (natural) "life" itself ("bios"). Along these lines, in some contemporary posthumanist discourse, "nature" betrays a "viral" or "mutational logic" that "exceeds and encompasses the boundary between the living or organic and the mechanical or technical" and thus becomes "parasitical" (Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? xviii-xix)—a "natural" logic that is represented as breaking the bounds of existing (social) thought but that ends up being a new species of deconstruction. Leaving aside for the moment posthumanism's updating of deconstruction, one of the key points here is that rather than changing the relations in which life is lived, the new battle cry of the left centers on new ways of thinking about life as excessive of human relations. Machine-thinking is in effect a romantic means of disappearing the social. Life is re-articulated as "machine" and "nature," and as a consequence, what makes both—social labor—becomes a fiction.

I argue that such rewritings of capitalism as machine-thinking are part of a long line of romantic writings of the social which emerge with particular force at times of economic crisis. Romanticism, I argue, is not merely a particular historical manifestation of a literary sensibility. It is a broader response (literary, philosophical, cultural and political) in the post-Renaissance West to the contradictions of capitalism: contradictions which romanticism reads in terms of science and technology and, in particular, instrumental rationality. To put this another way, the translation of the material contradictions of capital into the ideal (and in particular "machine thinking") is a structural feature of capitalism. It is rooted in the way that capital, as it develops, increasingly "resolve[s] personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade," one of the central consequences of which is that "for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation" (Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party).

Romanticism has always challenged the effects of capitalist relations (giving it a semblance of radicality) but not its root cause (exploitation). In this vein, Emerson, for instance, argues that "Poetry is the consolation of mortal men," because they "live cabined, cribbed, confined in a narrow and trivial lot—in wants, pains, anxieties and superstitions, in profligate politics, in personal animosities, in mean employments—and victims of these; and the nobler powers untried, unknown" ("Poetry and Imagination" 37). "A poet comes," Emerson continues, "who lifts the veil; gives them glimpses of the laws of the universe" (37-8). And what the poet reveals, according to Emerson, is that reality is only the phenomenal appearance of a higher, spiritual reality. Romantics like Emerson confine their understanding of capitalist conditions to its alienating effects and use of technology in the city (the space of the most developed technology and class divisions). They therefore misread capitalism as primarily a rigid, homogenizing and instrumental way of thinking. Poetry thus "consoles" ~~men~~, for Emerson, because, through it, the "veil" of phenomenal reality is lifted to reveal a symbolic universe which resists the instrumentality (i.e., the placing of ends before means) of modern life. Which is another way of saying that Emerson reduces capitalism to something that cannot be changed, only thought about differently. The concern, in other words, is with the ways in which, as Heidegger puts it, a technological age "take[s] thinking itself to be a technē, a process of reflection in service to doing and making" ("Letter on Humanism" 218). Nothing—and no one—is meaningful in and of itself, but for something else (a means toward an end).

This reading of instrumentality de-historicizes and de-materializes instrumentality. In focusing only on the how of instrumentality—how instrumental thinking equates the valuable with the efficient, with efficaciousness—the reasons why this has become the dominant logic in capitalism fade into the background. In fact, the marginalization of the why in cultural theory has become grounds for treating Heidegger (among others) as a militant against the metaphysics of origin and religious origin in particular. Along these lines, Timothy Clark affirms that, for Heidegger, "Ultimately, like human existence itself, it [Being] is without a 'why' (has nothing we might recognize as a meaning): it happened because it happened" (34). Yet in the name of the destruction of religious and metaphysical origin, Heidegger has been instrumental in updating spiritualism and, in effect, in dismantling the knowledge of material origin.

Poetry, for both Emerson and Heidegger, re-thinks the contemporary, and, in a more or less overtly religious language, produces a subject that recognizes the world's (material) insignificance from the vantage point of a higher immaterial reality. "Every natural fact," Emerson writes in Nature, "is a symbol of some spiritual fact" (26).

The mode of romanticism I address in this essay is ultimately a class response to the contradictions of capitalism which it reads in terms of science and technology, and in particular instrumental rationality. To be more specific, this romantic construction of nature (including nostalgia for the past) is a response to the fact that, as Marx and Engels argue,

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment". It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers. (Manifesto 486-7)

Romantic machine-thinking is a response to capital's relentless conversion of people into wage-laborers—a process which, in times of crisis, hits the "middle" sectors of class society (i.e, intellectuals, the petit-bourgeois) particularly hard. Facing the deep insecurity of their class position yet ultimately opposed to the working class struggle to transform capital, the first line of defense among intellectuals facing growing economic and social crisis has always been the turn to the immaterial, and often the irrational. That is to say, romantic idealism is a discursive relay of the displaced petit-bourgeoisie—and, in the face of the rising conflict between labor and capital, signals a retreat into and call for some "other way of life" in order not to engage the material conflicts of the present. This is why it surfaces with such force during moments of intensified crisis. Thus, for instance, the rise of romanticism in late 1700s to the early 1800s is also the time of revolutionary upheavals, the intensified destruction of peasant life, as well as the consolidation of the early industrial city with its obvious class contradictions with life in the early factories (before the period of "social reform" from the 1840s on in England)—which romanticism sees in terms of the excesses of Enlightenment rationality and the logic of quantification.

#### Anti-surveillance fugitivity atomizes struggle against capitalism

Monahan 15 (Torin Monahan, Associate Professor of Communication Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, external affiliate, Surveillance Studies Research Center, Institute for Policy & Social Research, University of Kansas, awarded the 2011 Surveillance Studies Book Prize for the best book on the topic of surveillance, former Associate Professor of Human and Organizational Development, Vanderbilt University, former Assistant Professor of Justice and Social Inquiry, Arizona State University, Ph.D., M.S., Science & Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, M.A., B.A., English Literature, California State University, Northridge, “The Right to Hide? Anti-Surveillance Camouflage and the Aestheticization of Resistance,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 12(2), June 2015, http://publicsurveillance.com/papers/Right-to-hide.pdf)KMM

Dangerous Play on the Surveillance Fashion Runway On a raised stage in a low-lit room, soft azure lights project gyrating patterns on the crowd as male and female models strut across the stage. A mix of house music with drum loops and simulated record scratching sets the tone, creating an edgy vibe to frame the presentation of novel surveillance and anti-surveillance clothing and accessories. Most of the designs incorporate electronic sensors and circuitry, either facilitating or obstructing the flow of personal information. An MC struggles to read the descriptive text for each design, as the models too have difficulty showing off their items without dropping them or engaging in exaggerated miming to communicate their intended functions.54 All of this—which was the “Anti/Surveillance Fashion Show” presented by designers from the Noisebridge hackerspace in 2010—generates a spectacle of frivolity, where performers poke ironic fun at their mock serious designs while audience members look on with vague curiosity. First, there is a demonstration of the Dazzle makeup described above. The voiceover asserts, “This will give you the freedom to travel around in public, free from the unblinking eye of computer surveillance.” 55 Next, affecting a secret-agent aesthetic, two men in dark suits and sunglasses model computerized belts that can surreptitiously scour nearby networks, collecting serial numbers, passwords, and other sensitive information. Another belt with “vibrating motors” and “digital compass” can constantly communicate the direction “north” to the wearer, who is cast as an agent on someone’s trail: “So he won’t lose track as you try to evade him in a twist of streets.” 56 In response to potential desires for restricting one’s exposure, the MC later opines: “Then, on the other hand, why try? . . . Get in on the game. Share, share. Over share.” 57 On cue, a woman takes center stage to present a handbag with an electronic display that constantly reveals the purse’s contents, which, the MC explains, will allow her to move quickly through security checkpoints. Each of these designs promises a kind of “freedom” or empowerment through selective sharing (e.g., a face without face recognition, a purse that enables transparency) or secretive data acquisition (e.g., network-sniffing belts). This play with security becomes part of what Lauren Berlant describes as an emerging aesthetic around precarity, where “adaptation to the adaptive imperative is producing a whole new precarious public sphere, defined by debates about how to rework insecurity in the ongoing present, and defined as well by an emerging aesthetic.” 58 I would assert that surveillance is not challenged or resisted by this aesthetic so much as it is manipulated or augmented to establish a façade of constrained freedom for individuals. When the fashion show turns toward issues of harassment of and violence against women, the severe limitations of this neoliberal logic of freedom become even more apparent. There are women’s shoes equipped with panic alarms to “tell people to stay back and for her handlers to pick her up.” 59 As an accompaniment to a hoodie that blinds cameras with LED lights, another design, referred to as a “rear window shade,” allows women to see when someone is sneaking up on them; the MC explains: “Of course, as a soloist, no one’s going to watch her back but her. . . . [The rear window shade will] allow her to surprise her surprise assailants.” 60 Finally, there is a device for dealing with upskirt photographs of women’s underwear. As a woman sashays to center stage in a very short skirt and high heels, the MC asks: But what about the common problem of the upskirt? What is a girl to do? Fortunately, she has the ‘crotch dazzler’. . . . She simply need not worry. . . . [The reflector on her underwear] will show only flashes of the paparazzi’s cameras rather than her privates.61 The message delivered by each of these designs is a variation on the theme of not worrying about the male gaze or sexual assault. Technological gadgets are presented as exerting a form of delegated patriarchal protection (with the panic alarm shoes and crotch dazzler panties) or individual responsibility for detecting and evading attackers (with the rear window shade).62 The designs problematically assume both the inevitability of dangers and the vulnerability of women. As Hille Koskela63 has illustrated, external security efforts tend to construct women as passive victims and sexualized objects, while responsibilization motifs do little to undermine these hegemonic constructs. Violence against women is normalized with these designs, just as is exposure to public surveillance, which effectively removes from the discussion any question about how to change the underlying cultural conditions of violence and abuse. The playfulness of the anti/surveillance fashion show belies the stated aspirations of Noisebridge. As the group writes: Constantly under the lens of the camera, fashion is a natural form in which to explore the relationship between surveillance and culture. How are we watched? How do we watch? How do we present ourselves to the eyes of the world? . . . Anti/ Surveillance [is] a runway show that explores the role of and our relationship with surveillance in our society.64 On the whole, as this section has suggested, the Noisebridge designs fail miserably at achieving any critical responses to these issues. Instead, they normalize unchecked exposure to surveillance in public, especially surveillance that can lead to objectification of and violence against women. The dominant message of this fashion show is that women and others must take responsibility, through the consumption of antisurveillance clothing and devices, for anticipating and managing dangers. A semblance of freedom is secured through such consumptive practices. Clearly, this postpones any engagement with root causes of gendered violence. Conclusion The aestheticization of resistance enacted by anti-surveillance camouflage and fashion ultimately fails to address the exclusionary logics of contemporary state and corporate surveillance. These anti-surveillance practices emerge at this historical juncture because of a widespread recognition of unchecked, pervasive surveillance and popular criticism of government and corporate overreach. The key to the popularity of these artistic efforts may be that they mobilize the trappings of radical intervention, in highly stylized form, but do so in ways that do not compel people to challenge state visuality projects. They offer hyper-individualized and consumer-oriented adaptations to undesired surveillance. To the extent that such efforts can be seen as critical interventions, they rely on an appeal to the pedagogical potential of art to galvanize meaningful political change. As Jacques Rancière explains: Art is presumed to be effective politically because it displays the marks of domination, or parodies mainstream icons, or even because it leaves the spaces reserved for it and becomes a social practice. . . . The logic of mimesis consists in conferring on the artwork the power of the effects that it is supposed to elicit on the behavior of spectators.65 In the case of the examples covered in this paper, it is clear that while some of the signifiers of critical art are present, for instance with the Fag Face Mask’s blurring of institutionally imposed identities, the primary message is nonetheless one of accommodating pervasive surveillance and inviting a playful dance with it. Recognition of the violent, unequal, and marginalizing applications of surveillance is bracketed or denied in the presentation of universal, neoliberal subjects in search of a modicum of (fashionable) control over their exposure. This is not to say that play has no place in resistance efforts. As Jeffrey Juris66 has illustrated in his ethnography of the anti-corporate globalization movement, play and frivolity can sometimes succeed in ways that oppositional tactics cannot. For example, in spaces of confrontation, people playing music or staging performances while dressed in elaborate costumes are effective because they are symbolically powerful solidarity-building activities that are not physically threatening to the police. Juris writes, “Such playful provocation represents a form of ritual opposition, a symbolic overturning of hierarchy much like medieval carnival…. Play, in particular, reveals the possibility of radically reorganizing current social arrangements.” 67 In the mode of anti-surveillance, groups like the Surveillance Camera Players similarly embody a spirit of play as they stage performances for video surveillance camera operators and spectators in public places like New York City subway stations.68 Perhaps because of the public setting of these performances, which usually end with police or security guards escorting players off public property, these interventions may have the effect of fostering in audiences a critique of policing priorities and the commodification of public space. Play of this sort may be an effective form of resistance that alters public awareness and cultural sensibilities, but it can be a difficult task for such interventions to problematize inequalities that can fester within assumptions of shared rights. Ultimately, discourses of “the right to hide” are weak variations of “the right to privacy,” both of which depend on conceptually inadequate and empirically deficient mobilizations of universal rights. Indeed, poor and racialized populations subjected to the most invasive forms of monitoring are much more concerned with issues of domination and control, along with the practicalities of survival, than they are with legal or philosophical abstractions like privacy.69 Privacy is also a deeply individualistic concept, poorly suited to forestall discriminatory practices against social groups.70 As Sami Coll explains, “The notion of privacy, as a critique of [the] information society, has been assimilated and reshaped by and in favour of informational capitalism, notably by being over-individualized through the self-determination principle.” 71 The discourse of the right to hide, as with the right to privacy, accepts the legitimacy of state demands for legible populations and offers symbolic compromises to assert degrees of freedom within those constraints. Instead of being content with artistic forms of hiding, countervisuality projects, by contrast, would “look back” and pursue alternatives to totalizing regimes of state visuality. They would seek to undermine the authority of state control by challenging the capitalist imperatives that lend legitimacy to forms of state violence and oppression.72 What is required is a full engagement with “the political,” which, as Rancière describes, is always in opposition to the police: The police is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social. The essence of the police lies neither in repression nor even in control over the living. Its essence lies in a certain way of dividing up the sensible. . . . Politics, by contrast, consists in transforming this space of “move-along,” of circulation, into a space for the appearance of a subject: the people, the workers, the citizens.73 Artistic intervention, broadly construed, can serve an important role in disrupting the authority of the police to structure the sensible, or exclusionary logics in societies more generally. Whether through filming and documenting cases of police misconduct,74 engaging in culture-jamming activities to raise awareness of corporate malfeasance,75 or challenging the status quo of rape culture by hacking into computer systems and publicizing attempts to cover up sexual assault,76 there are many viable prototypes for artists and activists.77 While it is uncertain the extent to which the designs discussed in this paper could ever achieve countervisuality, they could move in this direction if they sought to disrupt structural—as opposed to superficial—asymmetries in transparency. For instance, instead of fractal face paint, masks, or fashion accessories to hide from identification systems, alternative projects might “hijack” 78 computer algorithms to identify abusive police personnel or perpetrators of violence against women and hold them accountable. Projects might make visible data on police shootings, stop-andfrisk profiling, security contracts, drone attacks, or illegal rendition of terrorist suspects.79 Alternatively, artists could launch projects like the “Million Hoodies Movement for Justice” 80 that emerged after the 2012 shooting death of black teenager Trayvon Martin by neighborhood watch volunteer George Zimmerman in Florida; the “hoodies” used in this movement might disrupt legibility by surveillance apparatuses, but their more important function is to express solidarity, protest systemic violence against racialized groups, and galvanize change. By contrast, the anti-surveillance designs presented in this paper offer narrow forms of resistance that are unlikely to challenge current regimes of visuality. The reason for that has to do with how the artworks frame problems with surveillance as universally experienced or as needing individualized and product-based solutions to manage—rather than correct—systemic social problems. What gets left out of this framing is a serious discussion of race and gender differences, a critique of surveillance commodification, and reflexive awareness of the possibility that the artistic interventions could contribute to the harmful conditions they seek to change.

#### Describing debate and anti-black violence as “anti-competitive” reify neoliberalism to conceptualize debate injects neoliberal political ideology into this space

Zuidhof, ’12 (P.W. Zuidhof, Zuidhof is assistant professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, “Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism, pg. 7-11)JM

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life. The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state. The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism. By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221). Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life. The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics. This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Emphasis on black aesthetic resistance marginalizes material political-economic critiques of anti-blackness.

Burden-Stelly 16

(Charisse Burden-Stelly, PhD in African-American Studies from University of California Berkeley, dissertation entitled “The Modern Capitalist State and the Black Challenge: Culturalism and the Elision of Political Economy,” pgs. 192-194)

By the 1980s, there was an emergent emphasis on cultural affinity and connection in Africana studies that neglected the convergence of the material experiences in the structural organization of political economy among Blacks in the United States, Great Britain, Africa, and the Caribbean in the wake of a neoliberal agenda that produced a rollback of the state and its reformulation. This was instantiated through Reaganomics, Thatcherism, and Structural Adjustment that accompanied the collapse of the socialist/communist alternative. Despite this global restructuring, popular and scholarly understandings of American and “diasporic” Blackness did not involve a critique of political economy. An explanation of this elision will shed light on the conditions through and by which Africana studies shifted from its political, activist, and community-oriented distinctiveness to a Culturalist academic project. In other words, political economy became marginalized in the process of cultural specification of Africana studies.

Such overdetermination became evident in the “debates” taking place within the discipline focused around postcolonial studies/Black British Cultural Studies (BBCS), African American studies,1 and Afrocentricity. Each perspective posed culture as the critical site of struggle for the Black without any fundamental critique of political economy. Even though the postcolonial/Black British model ultimately became the point of reference and assumed near hegemonic status, it became highly modified and challenged by American scholars who felt that the antiessentialist, decentered, and ethnicized study of Black culture distorted and marginalized the experience of African Americans and obfuscated the peculiar dynamics of U.S. racialization. In the final analysis, the ubiquity of this “debate” further marginalized radical intellectual thought and political economic critique because the latter was deemed irrelevant to that narrow and myopic conversation based on culture. As a result, Africana studies has largely produced a cadre of alienated, privatized, culture experts who are unable to critically engage with the structural and material realities out of which the Black condition is forged. The discipline has produced a “technical intelligentsia” who is generally fit only to reproduce the “bureaucratic... apparatus” and whose “rationality... is only instrumental in character.”2 For this reason, the discipline has become unable, in its fundamentals, to engage significant issues of material abjection and political economy.

According to Martin Kilson, the maturation of Africana Studies was accomplished by and through the process of its “disciplinizing” and the proliferation of its most important innovation—Black cultural studies. Constituted by the overlapping of literary studies with psychological and societal studies, Black cultural studies provided an alternative Black ethnocentrism (Afrocentrism), and served as the primary source of enrichment of Africana Studies.3 His position is part of a debate that effectively materialized into a cultural critique of the culture concept that involved the three primary factions named above. What was being disputed and contested was not the assertion that culture was the primary means of understanding Blackness and the Black condition. Rather, the debate centered on the meaning of culture and how it should be articulated; what was at stake in particular narratives of Black/African culture; and what the effects on Africana Studies epistemology would be if one method of engaging culture was chosen over another. It questioned how culture should be operationalized, what methods and analytics best served the new disciplinary specification, and how relations of power were constituted by and instantiated through culture in the lives of Black people. The impetus for this debate was the growing influence of postcolonial studies/British cultural studies in the U.S. academy generally, and particularly of Black British Cultural Studies in Africana Studies.

The institutionalization and professionalization of Africana studies essentially collapsed the discipline into the study of Black culture. This was reified by the introduction of Black British Cultural Studies into the U.S. academy. The work and analytics of Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, Hazel Carby, Kobena Mercer, and other Black Britons were central to the epistemological transformation that resulted in African diaspora studies. This served in many ways to secure its legitimacy. The shift to African diaspora studies was predicated upon the appropriation and decontextualization of the tropes, concepts, and analytics of BBCS and a move away from historically and contextually specific Black American critiques of the U.S. racial state. As discussed in Chapter Four, the existent cultural specifications of Africana Studies precluded the (neo-) Marxist critique inhered in BBCS from taking root in the U.S. As a result, and unlike BBCS, African diaspora studies was unable to make an impact on Black struggles outside of the academy and on the structural issues related to these struggles. Africana studies challenged the racial epistemologies of the academy, but it fell far short of the critique raised by BBCS that systematically and deeply engaged the ways in which cultural forms were inextricably entangled with structures of domination and capitalist exploitation. Chapter Four argued that Africana studies became based on the grammar provided by American studies and the framework provided by area studies—(inter)disciplines that emerged in the context of the post-WWII proliferation of U.S. power and authority. BBCS satisfied the “need” for theory, complexity, and capaciousness in Africana studies, which had come under increasing criticism for ostensibly focusing on “victim studies” and “oppression studies.” The ready acceptance of BBCS by the American academy, though selective and partial, was due to the ways in which its abstracted articulations fit neatly within multicultural academic discourse and state pedagogy. Its cultural focus granted the state and capital reprieve from critical engagements with the material histories of racial domination, exploitation, and dispossession.

BBCS will be examined with particular focus on its critiques of the formulation of African American Studies in the U.S. academy, to elucidate the divergences in the two projects. As a counterhegemonic project, the origins and specifications of BBCS were forged as challenges to the British State and Thatcherism. When transferred to the U.S. context it proved compatible with the multicultural pedagogy of the U.S. state and became shorn of its radical critique. The following assertion by Laura Chrisman’s is particularly relevant to Africana Studies: “post-modernist intellectual concerns with language and subjectivity... infused both academia and ‘new Left’ politics to create a dominant paradigm of ‘culturalism’ for the analysis of social relations... [while] abandoning the tents and resources of socio-economic analysis.”4 Next, the Africana Studies “culture wars” will be unpacked to explicate the ways in which a narrow focus on African American Studies, Afrocentricity, and an Americanized version of BBCS foreclosed the possibility of Black radicalism and political economy critique in the discipline. Finally, the role of Culturalism will be elucidated through a critical analysis of The Black Atlantic—arguably the most important text in the shaping of African diaspora studies— written by Paul Gilroy in 1993. I argue that Gilroy’s preoccupation with the transnational routes of Black culture decentered the nation-state while reproducing its epistemological technology: Culturalism. Stated differently, while Gilroy challenged “methodological nationalism,”5 he did so through the cultural analytic of “diaspora”/Black Atlantic that reproduced the logics of nationalism and the nation-state. This explained the wide acceptance and acclaim received by The Black Atlantic and its acceptance in the U.S. academy. While The Black Atlantic was subjected to various forms of criticism, they failed to address the problematics of Culturalism.

#### Capitalism makes extinction inevitable through escalating ecological catastrophes and creates violence across racial and gendered lines – confronting it requires a reclamation of the state, not a rejection of it

Parr ‘15 (Adrian Parr – PhD in Philosophy @ Monash University, professor at the Institute of Critical Philosophy, UNESCO Co-Chair of Water Access and Sustainability. “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” June 2015, *Geoforum*, Volume 62, Pages 70-72)

In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ ( Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013 and Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability ( Parr, 2009). The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.

#### Romanticizing techno-conjuring metaphorizes resistance and reifies existing power dynamics.

Reed 16, PhD, Professor of Political Science @ Penn (Adolph, “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”,” <http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2>)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9 I assume that Trotskyists of their stripe still call themselves Marxists; if so, theirs is a Marxism that has more in common with geometry texts and the Baltimore Catechism than with open-ended historical materialist analysis. Indeed, the catechistic disposition is the spirit animating their snarky observation that it is “telling” – though they never indicate what it would tell if the charge were correct — that I supposedly “never engage” with any of the “massive” evidence that racial discrimination persists against black Americans. I have never denied the persistence of racial discrimination and therefore have no idea what they mean by “engage with.” I assume that what they want is for me to recite a litany of abuses or violations, doing the Confiteor at the same time, whether or not doing so would contribute to understanding or rectifying anything. I don’t have to testify to my knowledge of the existence of racial discrimination. I’ve dealt with being on the receiving end of it all my life.10 Moreover, racial discrimination and racial disparity are not the same thing. The latter does not automatically result from the former. And discrimination is often not necessary for, or even implicated in, reproduction of disparities. This is a key argument that Merlin Chowkanyun and I develop in our critique of the discourse of racial disparity.11 We do not deny the existence of racial disparities. We do argue that “racism,” accompanied by whatever adjectives – institutional, structural, postracial, etc.12 — is often not helpful for understanding the genesis of those disparities, how they are reproduced, or how to address them in policy interventions. Instead of engaging with that argument Birch and Heideman resort to baseless observations such as their claim that I have “always prided [myself] on being ahead of the curve.” This personal characterization is a bizarre alternative to critical argument about what I actually contend. And, of course, this is yet another area in which Birch and Heideman have no idea what they’re talking about. They don’t know me or for that matter anything about me that’s not a matter of public record, in what I’ve written for public consumption. Like much in their essay, this is an instance of uninformed proclamation of what they would like to be true to fit the a priori commitments of their dogma, which, by the way, is rather surprisingly like liberal individualism in the extent to which it hinges on speculation regarding individuals’ motives rather than examination of patterned social relations and processes. Haste to proclaim the magical ship’s pending arrival on the coastline is more an effusion of True Belief – and that’s the generous characterization — than sober analysis. And the magical predictions don’t require evidence of oppositional agency of any sort. Many in the Jacobin audience may be too young to recall how ventriloquy of the kind that Birch and Heideman and others now project onto BLM demonstrations supported proclamations of grand, transformative potential that some ersatz leftists assigned to the 1995 Million Man March and then to the 1999 Seattle anti-WTO demonstrations. More, however, should be able to remember the tsunami of almost clinically naïve pronouncements in 2008 and 2009 that the financial crash had either put neoliberalism on its deathbed or perhaps already killed it. For those who don’t recall that moment, Merlin Chowkwanyun’s fine critical assessment should be a bracing corrective.13 The authors also construct straw men and blatantly misrepresent arguments to provide themselves with easy targets. They adduce the fact that BLM has generated a program as a counter to my contention that that fact is not especially meaningful. They do so, of course, without fully addressing my actual argument: Some, perhaps many, of the items propounded in the initial 10 Point Plan are fine as a statement of reforms that could make things better in the area of criminal justice policy and practice. Many, if not most, of those assembled under the rubric ‘Vision for Black Lives’ are empty sloganeering and politically wrongheaded and/or unattainable and counterproductive. However, the problem is not a shortage of potentially effective reforms that could be implemented. The problem is much more a political and strategic one. And the focus on racial disparity both obscures the nature and extent of the strategic challenges we face and…undercuts our ability to mount a potentially effective challenge (italics added).14 I noted as well that, reminiscent of the trajectory of Black Power, a similar moment of affectively evocative political expression, the programs articulated in the name of BLM came primarily as responses to criticisms that it lacked a program. Their relation to the actual political practice of those who purport to represent the brand – and how else are we to understand the reality beneath the fatuous justifications offered by Garza and others as to why it’s important to honor the hashtag and its originators? — is not at all clear. The notion that having a program is eo ipso an indication of being “part of a broader radicalization around issue [sic] of class and inequality” is reasonable only within the sectarian universe of resolutionary socialists15 who measure one another’s significance by whether or not they publish newspapers or have good websites. Birch and Heideman and I apparently talk past each other regarding whether BLM should be seen as a serious political movement. Where one comes down on that question depends on how one understands what counts as a movement. I have no idea what their criteria are; I do know that, as public relations engineering has become increasingly prominent as an alternative to slow, careful organizing and constituency building, the label has been thrown around ever more promiscuously. When I refer to a political movement, as I’ve stressed for many years,16 I mean a relatively durable social and political force with a demonstrated capacity to mobilize resources and clearly defined constituencies – including actual people who have names and addresses – to advance programs and agendas with the goal of altering public policy and/or power relations. I don’t see how BLM qualifies by that standard. Activism undertaken under that name has contributed significantly to focusing public attention on patterns of police abuse and broader miscarriages of justice in the criminal justice system. However, from the perspective I indicate, extrapolations from that fact to broader claims that BLM is a substantial political movement are hyperbolic or aspirational. Birch and Heideman may operate with a different understanding of what constitutes a political movement. I assume they do because of their insistence that BLM is one, but they don’t address that question. They seem to accept proclamation by the self-appointed spokespersons – including those who claim not to be spokespersons while obviously adopting that role – press releases, demonstrations and other staged events in the mass-mediated (including social media) pageantry of protest as adequate evidence. In any event, I thought I had also made clear that the principal reason I, in their view, “refuse to engage even with the aspects” of the BLM current that the authors presume to be “in sync with” my politics and am not interested in helping to “advance a class perspective within the movement” is that my judgment is that what passes under the rubric BLM is primarily a mélange of episodic actions and performances and is not a coherent political movement. I know the response to that skepticism is assertion of BLM’s inner potentiality, which supporters contend is visible through a combination of esoteric interpretation and Faith and which skeptics are too jaundiced or biased to see – i.e., the cargo-cult pathology. Birch and Heideman say as much themselves: It is of course true that “Black Lives Matter” is shorthand for a variety of organizing efforts, whose goals can sometimes be opaque. The protests of the past two years are hardly the first to focus on questions of police violence or racism. And like many movements today, Black Lives Matter suffers from chronic volatility and organizational weakness.17 Thus even they acknowledge that, as Cedric Johnson indicates in a forthcoming article, who and what BLM is are in no way clear. The contemporary “movement for black lives” is a diverse phenomenon – horizontal, decentralized, and driven by organizations like #BlackLivesMatter, the Dream Defenders, the Black Youth Project 100, Assata’s Daughters, Freedom, Inc., Southerners on New Ground, Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, as well as dozens of other youth groups, black student unions and community-based organizations. Contemporary protests have found broad support among liberals, black nationalists, socialists, clergy, politicians, civil liberties advocates, and urbanites…Of course, there are different ideological tendencies operating within the movement for black lives. Broad acceptance of black ethnic politics, however, facilitates the very brokerage politics that many activists dislike about older black civil rights organizations. The spats between black lives matter’s founders and those who sought to use the hashtag without their permission reflected a proprietary sensibility, more suited to product branding and entrepreneurship than popular social struggle. Despite the various allusions to class and insistence by some supporters that there is a class-politics at the heart of black lives matter activism, the rapture of “unapologetic blackness” and the ethnic politics that expression implies will continue to lead away from the kind of political work that is needed to end the policing crisis.18 Comparing BLM’s commitment to the romantic racialism of the National Black Convention movement and following its trajectory through the 1972 Gary Convention, which rested on a similar commitment to a romantic racialism, Johnson contends: If the Gary Convention is the model here, then what we might expect is the fracturing of the movement into different brokerage camps, each claiming to represent the “black community” more effectively than the other, and more capable of amassing the necessary counterpower that might be politically impactful. One signpost of this possible outcome is the growing fissure among activists over school privatization and futile attempts to reconcile those differences with romantic calls to black unity…Black Lives Matter co-founder Patrice Cullors gives a sense of this problem, when she says that she will continue to work with black neoliberals because of their common bond as blacks. “That I don’t agree with neoliberalism doesn’t encourage me to launch an online assault against those who do. We can, in fact, agree to disagree. We can have healthy debate. We can show up for one another as Black folks inside of this movement in ways that don’t isolate, terrorize, and shame people – something I’ve experienced first hand.” She mistakes the core basis of political life, however. Sustained political work is held together by shared historical interests, especially those that connect to our daily lives and felt needs, not sentimental “ties of blood.”19 To what, then, are Birch and Heideman referring when they declare BLM’s potential? Which strains are the real or even the really real expressions of the tendency’s radical anti-capitalist telos? The answer, steeped in circular reasoning, is the ones that Birch and Heideman want to believe are consistent with their transhistorical, preformationist notions of how movements grow. This is not simply a matter of stipulating different criteria for assigning the label “political movement.” BLM’s amorphousness reflects and enables another tiresome political pathology that has become increasingly common in an era when an actually insurgent left is so remote from living memory and cargo-cult politics is so prominent. Activists, typically without visible institutional connections, stage more or less flamboyant events that often evoke nostalgic associations with earlier insurgencies – civil rights/Black Power demonstrations, sit-ins, militant “street action,” even purely rhetorical appropriation of the phrase “general strike” as a reference that sounds appealingly militant, totally disconnected from any concrete practice. Prior to BLM, Occupy and, more cynically, the Tea Party were the most highly publicized illustrations of this phenomenon, which is similar to an ad agency approach to movement-building. The point of these performances is to project simulacra of popular insurgency, which then become justification for issuing press statements and manifestos and, depending on the mood of the moment and skills of the operators, being recognized as spokespersons for the fictive movement. In the public interest world such groups are described as “astro-turf,” as contrasted to grassroots. Proliferation of this Kabuki theater politics among leftists stems in part from the dialectic of desperation and wishful thinking that underlies the cargo-cult tendency; it is commonly driven by an understandable sense of urgency that the dangers facing us are so grave as to require some immediate action in response. That dialectic encourages immediatist fantasies as well as tendencies to define the direct goal of political action as exposing, or bearing witness against, injustice. Occupy, for instance, proceeded from premises at least overlapping a tendency I have described as the Myth of the Spark,20 the notion that single events or dramatic acts can in themselves galvanize mass mobilization. That was also the dream that too many enthusiasts crafted for themselves about the Sanders campaign. Fetishization of the power of social media feeds the fantasy that movement-building can be automatic and instantaneous. That disposition is exacerbated in a context in which organizing as a project of deepening and broadening an actual base through building solidaristic relationships around shared interests is not part of an activistist culture in which radicalism is more posture and performance than strategic pursuit of a program.21 The strains of Trotskyism and anarchism popular in some activist quarters are drawn to spontaneist and voluntarist approaches to politics, which fit comfortably as well with the logic of insta-celebrity generated through Potemkin internet and social media campaigns. From that perspective, one of the most revealing and chilling features of the BLM phenomenon has been the unself-conscious clarity with which Alicia Garza and other of its prominent personalities represent, and no doubt genuinely understand, crafting and projecting their individual personae as identical with advancing political objectives.22 The potential for opportunism is great because the inertial material imperatives impel in that direction and unrestrained because the “movement” has no concrete constituency to which its spokespeople are accountable. What we get instead are shopworn calls to distinguish the really authentic BLM voices – i.e., what DeRay McKesson was until he wasn’t – from the fakers and hustlers and those who are genuinely grassroots from those who aren’t. So Birch and Heideman finger McKesson as epitomizing a “black professional class selling a desiccated form of opposition to racism as radical politics.” What distinguishes this “desiccated form of opposition to racism” from the good, radical anti-racism they insist is out there? The only clue we have is that McKesson embodies the former. Yet a year ago he embodied the latter! This kind of political differentiation grounded on claims to racial authenticity rehearses the product cycle in the hip-hop industry in the 1990s, in which an act started out packaged as authentic or hardcore, attained success and became crossover and thence became a target against which those that follow proclaim their own real authenticity. This sort of politics is also, as we’ve seen at least since Black Power, a hustler’s paradise. And all the millennial versions of New Age-y bullshit about leaderlessness and structurelessness obscure the fact that absence of organizational mechanisms of accountability enable anyone to say anything, or deny anything said, in the name of the “movement.” Overestimation of the political significance of protest and a related, all too familiar problem of confusing militancy and radicalism contribute to exaggerating the significance of eruptions like those associated with BLM. Militancy is a posture; radicalism is linked to program for social transformation, and protests do not necessarily challenge power relations at all. In some ways, as political scientists have pointed out for generations, they can validate existing power relations insofar as they appeal to established authority to accommodate their demands and pursue more effective incorporation into extant governing coalitions.23 Although they are so commonplace now that most people no doubt rehearse them unreflectively, presumptions that protest actions and militant postures are intrinsically radical or follow a natural trajectory leading them toward radicalism depend on the nostalgic wishful thinking and forms of fallacious reasoning I’ve already discussed. But Birch and Heideman’s narrative is also plagued by their utter innocence of the history of the last half-century of black politics, which is truly astonishing, especially in light of their profound self-assuredness, though I suspect the former may be a key enabling condition for the latter. They show no knowledge or understanding of the relation of black political development to the growth of the large national, state, and local public-private anti-discrimination and diversity apparatus, or of the broader incorporation of black people into the various distributive regimes, market-based and not, that constitute and reproduce hegemonic neoliberalism. At this moment, in one tiny illustration of this phenomenon, my mother is engaged in dealings with a black-owned or black-fronted firm – not clear whether it’s for-profit or a non-profit NGO — that is enmeshed in a web of boondoggles outsourced from the Road Home program that the state of Louisiana created and administers in concert with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development to provide assistance to people who suffered property damage in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Granted, the Road Home is an extraordinary policy intervention, and this is a trivial illustration. But this instance’s trivial and quotidian character is in a way the point. This sort of public-private, outsourced, marketized or semi-marketized activity is a node in an ever-expanding and reorganizing array of opportunity structures generated through neoliberalism and that contribute to its legitimation as everyday reality. More accurately, this activity and the individuals and organizations that participate in it constitute neoliberalization as an evolving political-economic, cultural and ideological order. People reproduce their material existence, not to mention pursue the entrepreneurial dreams that attest to the extent of Thatcherite ideological victory, through such nooks and crevices in the social administrative apparatus, whose public and private extrusions become ever more difficult to disentangle.24 At the same time, those structures and processes of neoliberalization are enmeshed with evolving black politics. The fact is that black people not only have access to these opportunity structures; they also participate in the processes that generate, shape, and legitimize them. The ambiguous relations of many prominent BLM figures and other black antiracist voices to the corporate and nonprofit interests that drive the assault on public goods and working people’s living standards underscore the class contradictions that antiracist politics papers over. The black political regime that emerged out of contestation and negotiation over the terms on which the victories of the 1960s would be consolidated institutionally was rooted from its inception in the dynamics simultaneously articulating market-driven pro-growth politics from the municipal level through national Democratic politics.25 It is not simply that the center of gravity of black politics accommodated to the regime of regressive redistribution and punitive social policy as it took shape and became hegemonic. Race-conscious black political discourse and practice, grounded on underclass ideology and a sharply class-skewed communitarian rhetoric of uplift and self-help26 and racial redistribution – anti-disparitarianism — as the crucial metric of social justice helped to define the left wing of Democratic neoliberalism over the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, black people participate as active and committed agents in the processes of neoliberalization, public and private – charterization of public education, devolution and outsourcing of the social service sector, direct and indirect attacks on public goods and labor standards in the name of individual enterprise (e.g., Uber, which openly promotes itself as providing opportunities for black Americans) or “community development,” private contracting at all levels, including the rent-intensifying real estate development that is unhelpfully called gentrification. Any serious left critique of black politics has to take those dynamics into account and must proceed from examining the actual complexities and contradictions, including class contradictions, in contemporary black political life. That is why my colleagues and I who authored “On the End(s) of Black Politics” singled out as problematic “the conceptual and political confusion that underwrites the very idea of a Black Freedom Movement.”27 Formulations like Black Freedom Movement and Black Liberation Struggle suffer from the circularity problem: they posit what needs to be demonstrated through historical and political analysis. This is not simply a formal flaw. Those formulations impose an idealist coherence, what is in effect a racial supra-consciousness or the teleological equivalent of a vanguard party, that obscures the history of political differentiation among black Americans and its significance for understanding both past and present. They posit a transcendent goal – empty signifiers like “freedom,” “liberation,” or “self-determination” — that most crucially unites and defines black Americans’ political aspirations. This presumption that a deeper racial truth, constant across historical and social contexts, guides black politics requires diminishing the significance, and often enough necessitates the procrustean erasure, of the historical specificity of political dynamics involving black Americans at any moment in order to sustain the teleological narrative of fundamental continuity.

#### The alternative is a structural socialist analysis to strategically organize emancipation through a mass socialist movement---only total buy-in can deconstruct the totalizing nature of capital---identitarian politics fractures movements and fails to spur social or institutional change

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(Mark and Adolph, “THE CRISIS OF LABOUR AND THE LEFT IN THE UNITED STATES”, November 2015, Socialist Register)

Any serious discussion of the prospects for rebuilding a left must start from the understanding that the left in the US, as in the rest of the capitalist world, suffered a strategic defeat, and that capital has reorganized and emerged from the 2008 economic crisis even stronger.24 While the extreme financialization of capital is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of episodic crises, this crisis once again confirms that there is no necessary correlation between crisis and revitalization of the left. In fact, notwithstanding glimmers of hope like SYRIZA in Greece and strong showings by anti-austerity parties in the spring 2014 European elections, the history of the post-2008 crisis politics in Europe would indicate that the more intense the crisis, the more deeply reactionary the response. This does not mean that those who embrace a transformative vision must abandon all hope. Rather, the priorities, activities and resources of those who would rebuild a real left must be informed by this strategic sensibility. Building or rebuilding an effective left presence will be quite likely a decades-long process. This means that we are not well served by clambering after the Next Big Thing. We must start by excising the impulse – quite understandable for a political movement devoid of any real agency – toward utopian dreaming and wishful thinking. The spark will not ignite the prairie fire. Nor will the Ark float on its own account no matter how carefully we construct it. Recognizing the left’s political irrelevance can be emancipating, as it reduces the sense of urgency to try to mobilize around every one of neoliberalism’s daily outrages. That should provide space for serious strategic discussion of how to begin to build a mass socialist movement based in the working class and the creation of new institutions capable of mobilizing cross-class solidarity, as Sam Gindin has articulated in a particularly clear and compelling way.25 Certainly, the US left could benefit from a nonsectarian, organized force with a coherent strategic vision and programme. The absence of a disciplined, unified and sophisticated group of cadre is a major source of the left’s incoherence, and helps explain why moments of spontaneous political upsurge have had, at best, an episodic impact and remain unconnected to similar moments in the past – even those in which the same activists have participated. Such organization, however, cannot be created in a vacuum. It can only emerge in tandem with a growing working-class movement. We fear that in the specific context of US history and practice, the socialist project is too narrow a platform from which to launch a broad and far ranging left revitalization. Socialist practice in the US has become the domain of sectarian groups that drive away working-class support, and socialist consciousness has not embedded itself in any significant sections of the working class or a left capable of exercising social power. That failing reflects the cultural and ideological triumph of neoliberalism and the identitarian ideologies and programmes that serve as its left wing. In this environment, building socialism is exclusively a project of cadre development, albeit one that cannot hope to succeed apart from broader movement-building. Broad movement-building requires mobilizing around an agenda of substantively anti-capitalist reforms that directly and militantly assert the priority of social needs over market forces, bourgeois property rights and managerial prerogative in the workplace and production process. Struggles to preserve and expand public institutions and to decommoditize basic human needs like housing, transportation, healthcare and education could begin to address the immediate challenge, which is to create a new popular constituency for a revitalized movement, instead of reorganizing or re-mobilizing an already existing but totally marginalized left.26 Some question whether the current US labour movement is too narrow a platform on which to rebuild a left. In a widely circulated article, ‘Fortress Unionism’, Rich Yeselson correctly highlights the atrophy of the labour movement and shows how its decline began with the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947. He contends that labour’s ‘current institutional expression cannot, via a creative conceptual breakthrough (“tactics or broader strategy”), engender a vast growth in union strength comparable to its former peak. In short, “organized labor” can no longer create a space for workers to join their organizations by the millions’.27 In grim statistical detail, Jake Rosenfeld’s What Unions No Longer Do gives fuel to this thesis. He points out that despite decades of exemplary, heroic and pioneering organizing by Justice for Janitors in the immigrant community, ‘Today only one in seven Hispanic janitors in the United States belongs to a union, down from one in five back in 1988, when Justice for Janitors began’.28 Yeselson calls for a ‘fortress unionism’ that would ‘defend the remaining high-density regions, sectors and companies’ and then ‘Wait for the workers to say they have had enough. When they demand in vast numbers collective solutions to their problems, seize upon that energy and institutionalize it.’29 This approach correctly identifies the urgent need to preserve the remnants of the current labour movement as an institutional base upon which to build a future revitalized movement. And it also correctly points out the haplessness of willy-nilly organizing schemes that do little to build power for working people while exposing their best leaders in unorganized workplaces to massive employer retaliation without any ability to defend them. But a strategy of waiting for workers to say they have had enough ultimately relies on magical thinking not unlike that of isolated Japanese soldiers scattered on island outposts at the end of the Second World War waiting for reinforcements from a defeated empire. Many of Yeselson’s critics, however, are equally quixotic. Bruce Raynor and Andy Stern, two of the most cynical practitioners of a unionism that disempowers workers and is based on a model of global class collaboration, point out that the ‘fortress’ strategy will do little to reduce inequality. Instead, they place their hopes in ‘strategic alliances with willing employers’; in unions developing value-added services to complement human resource departments; and in leveraging union and public-sector pension funds to rebuild union density.30 This strategy would liquidate the very concept of an independent labour movement. Given its decimation and marginalization, any revitalization movement would need to be built from a base that is far broader than the current institutional labour movement. A revitalized labour movement will have to embrace new organizational forms and some of the models emerging from new labour organizing show significant potential. Some are driven by necessity as the legal status of many immigrants and of workers in industries such as trucking, taxi driving and residential construction make organizing under current labour law virtually illegal. Much of this new organizing is being done by Worker Centers with heavy foundation funding and has the character of social work along the settlement house model of the early twentieth century. Much of it seems also, more or less openly, to fold class analysis into identitarian discourses that both substitute moralizing for political critique and fit comfortably within the NGO model. Such impulses, as well as the popularity of neologism, underlie arguments that current conditions have generated a new social formation, a ‘precariat’ that lies outside the traditional capitalist class structure.31 But some associated with this category have begun to evolve into substantial, self-conscious worker-run organizations. The Taxi Workers Alliance grew from a small New York City advocacy group to become a national organization (whose members are classified as ‘independent contractors’ and thus ineligible for union representation under US labour law) and was recently admitted to the AFL-CIO.32 In Vermont and elsewhere, strategic Workers Centers have built organic alliances with the labour movement and gone on to lead significant campaigns for healthcare for all, paid sick days and economic justice through the mobilization of a working-class constituency.33 Some argue that these campaigns and projects have the capacity to coalesce into geographically based class-conscious organizations and have called for the building of worker assemblies to give voice to this new movement.34 Such an effort would require a level of ideological sophistication and institutional independence that does not currently exist. Attempts to establish these structures on the ground have been premature and could actually inhibit the kind of broad, class-based organizing that inspires this movement in much the same way that many Labor Party chapters became captured by an ‘activistist’ mentality that focused more on preaching to the converted than building a constituency, while driving away real working-class voices who represented something more than themselves. New models are most successful when they can leverage existing organization and power to build outwards into new organization. Recent experiences organizing healthcare and homecare workers, hotel and casino workers and building services employees are fruitful examples of smart and strategic organizing that have leveraged existing union relationships and/ or political opportunities to build power for working people. We also look to the logistics organizing campaigns – which focus on the chokepoints of global capitalism and build on existing union power on the docks and other shipping centres – as having the potential to develop a particularly powerful form of a strategic union presence in economic sectors at the very core of contemporary capitalism.35

## Case

### 1NC---Presumption

#### Vote negative on presumption:

#### 1: The 1AC began by advocating that the United States federal government, which they define as a “techno-social infrastructure that . . . served as the basis for colonial and racial extraction” should be the actor of the advocacy---if you agree with the thesis of the 1AC, you should vote negative because that institution should not be the entity that hauntologically techno-conjures.

#### 2: Inherency---their strategy of deepfaking the hieroglyphics of Black flesh already exists with academia writ large voting aff in this round does nothing to further- every other round proves it should have changed debate already.

#### 3: Debate---the idea reading this argument in debate is radical is flawed they read the aff to debate T in almost every round which proves the aff is commodified by and for competition.

### 1NC---Theory

#### Their account of juridical power is too overarching.

Currah 14 – Paisley Currah, Professor of Political Science and Women’s & Gender Studies at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, M.A and Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University, “The State”, TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, Volume 1, Numbers 1-2, May

For the Left, however, the liberal state and the principles of political equality it celebrates conceal the maldistribution of equality. A certain domesticated form of selfhood is reproduced when individuals petition the government for recognition of their particular selves and, in turn, recognize themselves when they are hailed by various state apparatuses — interpolation is the term of art used to describe this relationship. From this more radical perspective, then, the transgender rights movement is merely insisting that the hailing be more accurate. A transgender man will now have an M on his driver's license, and the police officer who stops him on the street may call him “sir” rather than “ma'am.” But the power of the state to surveil individuals and to regulate gender remains intact. While the political approach of many trans legal advocates requires them to naturalize gender identity, the more radical trans Left recognizes that “sex” cannot be made to fit into a rigid presocial biological schema of male and female. On the question of sex classification, the goal should not be to install the “right” definition of sex in the regulatory architecture to make the legal recognition of transition possible but to get the state out of the business of defining sex in the first place.

Both the classical liberal theory of the state and the Left's critical rejoinder, however, lack the capacity or perhaps the flexibility to account for contradictions in policies for sex reclassification. Perhaps what underlies the inability to account for contradictions in sex classification is the belief that the state actions should manifest an underlying coherence. In fact, the hope — or fear — that we are governed by a single, rational legal structure is belied by the existence of a virtually uncountable number of state institutions, processes, offices, and political jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, when some individuals cross borders, walk into a government office to apply for benefits, get a driver's license, go to jail or prison, sign up for selective service, try to get married, or have any interaction with any state actor, the sex classification of some people can and often does switch. Even within a single jurisdiction, almost every particular state agency — from federal to municipal — has the authority to decide its own rules for sex classification. To complicate matters even more, both state and federal judges have found that one's sex classification for one social function may not hold for others. These include legislatures, courts, departments, agencies, elected officials, political appointees, public servants, constitutions, laws, regulations, administrative rules, and informal norms and practices. These intertwined and sprawling apparatuses all rest, sometimes uneasily, on diachronous layers of sedimented yet still active historical state formations. Given this disarray, it is not surprising that different state entities might sometimes advance different, even incommensurate, projects. Indeed, how could they not?

According to Gilles Deleuze, a concept “should express an event rather than an essence” (1995: 14). Molar, large-scale accounts of sex and the state have assumed a sameness to sex and a singular rationality to state actors, decisions, and projects. If the state is not unitary, coordinated, and hierarchically organized in an ultimately rational way — if, as Michel Foucault suggests, “the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think” (1991: 103) — then it should come as no surprise that state definitions of sex are also plural. A contradiction is something that does not make sense, a position that is logically inconsistent. To begin by letting go of the assumption that there is any “there there,” any whatness, to (legal) sex apart from what an agency says it is, the contradiction evaporates. The official sex designation — or, more precisely, the M or the F — stamped on documents or coded in records becomes the starting point. Then an analysis can focus not on what sex is, or what it should be, but on what it does, what it accomplishes, what it produces. Indeed, if the only thing we know for sure about sex is what any of these many state actors say it is in any particular instance, sex will turn out to be as messy and diffuse a concept as the state. Entering into the analysis without a firm sense of what sex is or what the state is — as a priori facts, as edifices — makes the processes through which they come into being more visible. It might be better to defer attempts to resolve — theoretically or politically — the messiness in order to understand what a particular system of sex designation does for a particular state project such as recognition or redistribution (Currah, forthcoming).

Of course, states should not only or always be imagined as messy, scattered nodes of local and arbitrary power arrangements. The Leviathan state's terrible concentrated authority to impose sanctions (death, imprisonment, fines) has been the subject of theories of sovereignty for centuries. For this purpose, the most apt definition of the state begins with the simple description from Max Weber: “A human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate physical violence within a particular given territory” (1991: 78). To create a truly compelling account of sovereign violence and the paradox of sovereignty, one must take Weber's definition, put question marks around “legitimate,” and add the observation made by scholars such as Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben that the force that creates the law and makes it legitimate cannot be justified by a law that does not yet exist. Still, much of what states do — regulating the health, safety, and public welfare through myriad regulations, rules, decisions, practices — does not reach the threshold of juridical violence, even if those actions are ultimately undergirded by its threat. Fetishizing a generalized idea of the state and its terrifying or redemptive power (depending on one's perspective) can obscure what is actually happening in the local, micro, particular sites where most public authority is exercised. While it is crucial to theorize the singular finality of state violence, neglecting to examine the messiness of actually existing and potentially incommensurate policies, practices, rules, and norms risks substituting the conceptual for the concrete and gets in the way of understanding what might actually be going on (Latour 1995: 48).

#### The ontology of technology isn’t static---its influenced by social/political change

Paul Rekret 19, Associate Professor of Politics at Richmond University, “Seeing Like a Cyborg? The Innocence of Posthuman Knowledge,” Chapter 6 in *Digital Objects, Digital Subjects: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Capitalism, Labour and Politics in the Age of Big Data* Edited by David Chandler and Christian Fuchs, 2019, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/25880/1004203.pdf?sequence=1

Despite the undeniably heterogeneous and complex research programmes that Haraway and Latour developed from these basic insights, our concern here is with the widespread adoption of the claim that we inhabit an age of hybridity. The view that the subject has been eroded in the current epoch is an ontological contention that increasingly shapes an expansive theoretical paradigm and is, moreover, often taken as self-evident. But it is worth remarking that this is an odd claim – at least where it implies a relation between ontology and history – for it insinuates that, in general, while existence itself is defined by hybridity, this only becomes self-evident in an epoch where technological change makes its manifestation undeniable. To twist a well-known phrase, history here becomes the midwife of ontology, where the hybrid entities that emerge from bioand enhancement technologies bear the weight of actualising the ontological assertion that the human never was an integral, autonomous being exercising control over itself or its surroundings in the first place. Yet such a claim so often denotes a move that seeks to rescue technological advancements – which are often the product of destructive capitalist compulsions, if not explicitly militarist impulses – for progressive theoretical ends. It follows that it falls upon the theorist’s ontological speculations to salvage and reimagine the technological for emancipatory purposes, a task which can only be accomplished where the deeper truths about existence which these processes harbour can be discerned. It is in this way that the posthumanist can be said to collapse ontological speculation into ethico-political argument, since it is the affirmation of hybridity and concordant critique of anthropocentrism that acts as the starting point for ethical and political thought in this context (Rekret 2016). Besides producing a peculiar oscillation between history and ontology, the critique of anthropocentrism can sometimes effect a sort of theoretical narcissism which places the theorist at the endpoint of an eschatology wherein the true nature of existence is only discernible from the historical instant at which they find themselves.